Scientology catches Masterson victim attorneys with AI-fudged citations in court filing

Just what the Danny Masterson victims did not need. Their attorneys with the prestigious firm Boies Schiller Flexner have admitted their “embarrassing” mistake after Scientology accused them of including bogus AI-generated citations in an appeal briefing that was filed in late July.

This is in regards to the civil lawsuit filed against the Church of Scientology, its leader David Miscavige, and church celebrity Danny Masterson by the same three Jane Doe victims from the criminal case that put Masterson in prison. The lawsuit was also filed by the husband of one of the victims and another woman who was not involved in the criminal trials. Those five plaintiffs sued civilly in 2019 over harassment they say they have endured since the women came forward to the LAPD with their allegations about the That ‘70s Show actor.

The lawsuit at one point was forced into Scientology’s “religious arbitration” until an appeals court overturned that decision. Then it was put on hold during Masterson’s two criminal trials. After Masterson was convicted in May 2023, Scientology attempted to gut the lawsuit with anti-SLAPP motions that were denied by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Upinder Kalra. Scientology appealed Kalra’s ruling to the 2nd Appellate Division of the California Court of Appeals. In April Scientology filed its appeal brief. Then in late July attorneys for the plaintiffs from Boies Schiller Flexner filed their “respondents’ brief.” (In appeals court terms, Scientology here is the “appellant” and the Jane Does are the “respondents.”)

After each side has had its say, appeals court procedure calls for the appellant, Scientology, to get one more turn by filing an “appellant’s reply brief.” Then, fully briefed, the case would go to oral arguments and eventually a ruling.

But the appellant’s reply brief Scientology filed this month opens with a stunning allegation: That the Boies Schiller Flexner attorneys included numerous bogus case law citations in their respondents’ brief that Scientology suspected were AI-generated.

“The portions of the brief containing errors bear many of the hallmarks of AI-generated case citations…. multiple sections of plaintiffs’ brief are filled with erroneous citations that mischaracterize holdings and refer to cases on unrelated areas of law. Some cases are mistitled such that it is difficult to determine what cases plaintiffs are intending to cite in the first place. And one case plaintiffs cite is completely made up. At minimum, this court should disregard these sections of plaintiffs’ brief and find the arguments plaintiffs make forfeited.”

A table is attached to the document detailing 17 instances of cases being cited incorrectly by the plaintiffs’ attorneys.

For example, the plaintiffs’ brief cites a 1995 case, Adams v. Paul, to support an argument about the Kalra court being obligated to consider evidence of a conspiracy. Scientology points out, however, that the actual Adams v. Paul decision doesn’t mention conspiracy at all.

Scientology submitted its accusatory filing on September 8, and we obtained a copy of it the next day after receiving an automated email message from the court that it had been filed. When we saw the allegations being made by Scientology, we contacted the attorneys at Boies Schiller Flexner to give them an opportunity to respond. They then asked us to hold off on revealing that Scientology had made these accusations until they could file a response with the court.

That response was filed late on Friday night and we obtained a copy of it yesterday.

It is a motion written by Boies Schiller Flexner partner John Kucera, who is asking the court to accept a corrected version of the respondents’ brief since it did, in fact, turn out that the use of artificial intelligence resulted in errors to the original filing.

I was and am the sole Firm partner with responsibility for overseeing the preparation and filing of the Filed Response Brief in this action. Under my direction, and with consent of the individual Respondents, the preparation of the Filed Response Brief included the use of artificial intelligence tools. The Firm is committed to the responsible use of artificial intelligence and has adopted policies and implemented trainings intended to protect against the risks of the improper use of artificial intelligence. Independent of the use of artificial intelligence tools, Firm lawyers are always expected to scrupulously proofread and cite check the accuracy of the factual and legal claims in court filings.

Notwithstanding these controls, the Filed Response Brief included material citation errors, including those identified in Appellants’ Reply Brief. As the attorney and partner in charge of the Filed Response Brief, I am embarrassed by and very much regret these errors. The Firm is undertaking an investigation to determine why its controls failed and to ensure appropriate corrective action is taken. However, as the supervising attorney ultimately responsible for signing and submitting the Filed Response Brief, I bear the responsibility for failing to personally verify the citations included in the brief.

The individual Respondents have been informed of the errors in the Filed Response Brief, and I have explained that the errors in the Filed Response Brief are due to my failure to verify and that I am responsible. None of the individual Respondents previously were aware of the errors included in the Filed Response Brief.

Kucera indicated that Scientology is opposing his motion to have the court accept a corrected version of the respondents’ brief.

Oh, this is awful.

If you remember, the original attorney for the Jane Does who filed this lawsuit in 2019 was Brian Kent, the Philadelphia lawyer who was recently disciplined by the Pennsylvania Bar for having an unprofessional relationship with another victim of Scientology who was looking to sue the church. (That woman, who did not identify herself in her complaint to the Bar, we are referring to as Jane Roe in order to differentiate her from the women in this lawsuit.)

Unhappy with Kent’s representation even before that scandal erupted, Jane Doe 1 in 2022 replaced him with Brad Edwards, the attorney who had represented numerous victims of Jeffrey Epstein. The other Jane Does, meanwhile, switched to Boies Schiller Flexner, one of the top litigation firms in the nation. Then, without explaining why, Edwards said last year that he had to remove himself from this lawsuit, as well as one he was handling for Leah Remini. Jane Doe 1 then joined the others so that all of the plaintiffs were now being represented by Boies Schiller Flexner.

Scientology’s appeal, meanwhile, looked like more of a timewaster than something that could really harm the lawsuit, and the Jane Does were in the process of trying to bolster this suit by adding another plaintiff as well as civil racketeering allegations.

We thought it was likely that this current appeal would be swept aside, the more robust new complaint adopted, and with Masterson in prison this lawsuit looked like it was going to be a very serious problem for Scientology.

But now, the Boies Schiller Flexner firm appears to have handed David Miscavige a big club to hit them over the head with. We really have no idea whether the court will go along with Kucera’s proposal to accept a corrected brief and chalk it up to experience. And you can bet that Scientology will play up its opposition to that proposal to the hilt.

In a separate story, we’ll get appellate attorney TX Lawyer’s thoughts on how much trouble this lawsuit is in after Kucera admitted that his firm misused AI in the preparation of the brief.

It’s bad enough that such a prestigious law firm would make this mistake. But in a lawsuit against the scorched-earth specialists at Scientology? Unthinkable.

A representative told us the law firm would not be giving statements about the situation other than what was in Kucera’s motion.

Here is the full appellants’ reply brief that Scientology filed on September 8.

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Before addressing the merits of this appeal in the introduction section below, we wish to draw the court’s attention to the fact that plaintiffs’ brief contains a series of troubling citation errors. The portions of the brief containing errors bear many of the hallmarks of AI-generated case citations. A table detailing the errors we identified is included as Attachment A at the end of this brief. As detailed below in sections IV.A.2.a, IV.B.1, and IV.B.3, as well as in Attachment A, multiple sections of plaintiffs’ brief are filled with erroneous citations that mischaracterize holdings and refer to cases on unrelated areas of law. Some cases are mistitled such that it is difficult to determine what cases plaintiffs are intending to cite in the first place. And one case plaintiffs cite is completely made up. At minimum, this court should disregard these sections of plaintiffs’ brief and find the arguments plaintiffs make forfeited. (See Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 754 (Shaw).)

With growing frequency, courts around the country have confronted similar filings containing citations to non-existent case law and misrepresentations of the facts and holdings of cases. (Mavy v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (D.Ariz., Aug. 14, 2025, No. CV-25-00689-PHX-KML) 2025 WL 2355222 (Mavy) [collecting cases].)

In response, courts have reacted strongly to such briefs by, for example, imposing monetary sanctions, striking filings, referring counsel to bar associations, and removing counsel from the case. (See Mavy, supra, 2025 WL 2355222, at p. *10 [striking plaintiff’s opening brief and removing counsel from case]; Johnson v. Dunn (N.D.Ala., July 23, 2025, No. 2:21-cv-1701- AMM) 2025 WL 2086116 [disqualifying counsel from case and ordering them to provide a copy of the court’s order to their clients, opposing counsel, and the presiding judge in every pending case in which they are counsel of record]; Mata v. Avianca, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 678 F.Supp.3d 443, 466 [ordering $5,000 in sanctions and instructing counsel to notify each judge falsely identified as an author of a fake case].)

Identifying and addressing these false citations has added considerably to the attorney’s fees incurred for this appeal. We take no position on the proper remedy here beyond forfeiture of the arguments plaintiffs made in reliance on false citations. Any additional remedy, we leave to the sound discretion of this court. [1. We also note that additional attorney’s fees were expended in preparing an opposition to plaintiffs’ frivolous motion to augment the record. That motion sought to add a reporter’s transcript to the record even though it was already in the record because the Church had designated it, the court reporter filed it with this court, and it was cited in the opening brief. The court properly denied that motion.]

INTRODUCTION

The anti-SLAPP motion subject to this appeal challenged several online publications and private conversations about issues of public importance. The Church’s [2. “Church” refers to both parties filing this brief, the Church of Scientology International and the Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International.] motion carefully parsed plaintiffs’ lengthy complaint paragraph by paragraph and line by line, identifying discrete but important allegations of protected speech that underlie portions of plaintiffs’ broader causes of action. The Church’s motion was narrow and targeted, and so is this appeal.

Plaintiffs’ brief is not narrow or targeted. Rather than addressing just the handful of statements and paragraphs at issue in this appeal, plaintiffs attempt to litigate the contents of their entire complaint. But the vast majority of the allegations they dredge up have nothing to do with the Church’s narrow anti-SLAPP motion. These allegations are also false. More to the point, they are irrelevant to this appeal and plaintiffs raise them simply to defame the Church. The proper time to litigate the rest of plaintiffs’ baseless allegations is on remand when the portions of the complaint that are not included in the anti-SLAPP motion will be tested at summary judgment and possibly trial with actual evidence.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on irrelevant allegations not before the court confirms the weakness of their position. But plaintiffs’ brief also makes several other crucial legal errors. First, they argue that private speech is categorically unprotected if it seeks to prevent information from entering the public sphere. But this argument impermissibly evaluates the normative value of speech, and ultimately rests on plaintiffs’ assumption, unsupported by any actual admissible evidence, that the speech at issue was part of a conspiratorial campaign of harassment and retaliation.

Second, plaintiffs try to wave away the California Supreme Court’s instruction in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 (Baral), that an anti-SLAPP motion may isolate allegations of protected activity from unprotected activity, even when both underlie a single cause of action. In so doing, plaintiffs push for a novel “pattern-based torts” exception to Baral for which there is no legal support.

Here, defendants challenged discrete petitioning activity alleged in the complaint. And plaintiffs have not introduced admissible evidence showing a probability of success on any of their causes of action arising from this activity. Accordingly, the allegations should be stricken, as well as the portions of the causes of action that rely on them. In so doing, the complaint will be properly narrowed to eliminate legal theories based on imposing liability for protected petitioning activity. The parties can then litigate the merits of the narrowed complaint on remand.

Plaintiffs’ brief ignores several arguments raised in the Church’s opening brief, thus conceding them. Those arguments include: (1) that plaintiffs’ claims arise from the challenged allegations (see AOB 35–39); (2) that all of the challenged allegations meet the first part of the test set forth in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn) (see AOB 27–30); (3) that the allegations regarding online speech including the various social media posts and reviews of Riales’s food truck satisfy the second FilmOn step as well (see AOB 30–31); and (4) that the allegations of speech to a reporter in paragraph 175, lines 5–6, satisfy both FilmOn steps (see AOB 31, 33–34).

Finally, as noted in the preliminary statement and detailed further below, plaintiffs’ brief is riddled with suspicious citation errors that at minimum require forfeiture of the arguments they support and may also require additional sanction from the court in its discretion.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I. The Church seeks to strike only the limited portions of plaintiffs’ complaint that arise from protected speech. The rest of plaintiffs’ complaint is not at issue in this appeal.

This appeal addresses online speech about the plaintiffs and private speech about the truth of sexual assault allegations against a famous actor. This is quintessential protected activity under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. This appeal does not address most of what plaintiffs’ brief discusses.

An anti-SLAPP motion may isolate allegations of protected activity, even when such allegations are bound up with unprotected activity into a single cause of action. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) In resolving an anti-SLAPP motion, “courts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are protected.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 (Bonni), emphasis added.) That is what the Church’s motion did here.

The Church’s opening brief was clear about the narrow scope of its anti-SLAPP motion and appeal. It identified the specific paragraphs of plaintiffs’ complaint that it sought to strike, and stated that plaintiffs’ “other allegations of stalking, surveillance, and harassment were not challenged in the Church’s anti-SLAPP motion.” (AOB 15–16, fn. 2, emphasis added.) Only fourteen paragraphs of plaintiffs’ nearly three-hundred-paragraph complaint are at issue. [3. These paragraphs allege that: (1) Masterson’s publicist, Jenni Weinman, reached out to Bixler and Doe #1 to discuss their allegations against Masterson and dissuade them from speaking publicly (1 AA 50 [¶¶ 88–90], 65 [¶ 177]); (2) purported agents of the Church, including Kathy Gold, Virginia MacGregor, and Heather Seidler, published social media posts about the plaintiffs and their allegations (1 AA 53 [¶ 110], 54 [¶ 111], 68 [¶ 190], 73 [¶ 227], 77 [¶¶ 253, 256]); (3) purported agent Michelle Miskovich contacted a reporter to state that plaintiffs’ claims were false, and contacted a witness to dissuade her from speaking with the police (1 AA 65 [¶ 175]); (4) purported agent Vanessa Mooney contacted a witness to tell her Doe #1 was fabricating her claims (1 AA 65 [¶ 176]); (5) unidentified purported agents of the Church posted false online reviews of Riales’s food truck (1 AA 72 [¶ 220]); and (6) purported agent Ilaria Urbinati approached Doe #2 to discuss her allegations, persuade her that Bixler was “insane,” and get her to admit that she was lying (1 AA 77 [¶ 255]).] (AOB 15–16.) For some of these paragraphs, only individual lines are targeted. (1 AA 65 [¶ 175], 72 [¶ 220].) Plaintiffs’ causes of action for stalking, IIED, and loss of consortium are challenged only to the extent they arise from these allegations. (See AOB 15–16.)

Plaintiffs ignore this narrow scope. They attempt to muddy the waters by raising allegations of a supposed “campaign” of harassment, surveillance, and threats. (RB 9–11, 28–30, 32, 41– 42, 44, 46.) But these allegations are irrelevant to this appeal because they are not the allegations in the complaint that the anti-SLAPP motion seeks to strike. (AOB 15–16, fn. 2.) And to be clear, allegations that the Church was involved in any animal abuse, stalking, surveillance, or harassment are false. [4. The Church submitted evidence in support of its anti-SLAPP motion demonstrating as much. (See, e.g., 1 AA 189, 248, 250, 280, 283, 285, 315, 318–319, 352, 355–356, 358–359.)] Further, by again raising the false concept of “Fair Game,” plaintiffs argue that this alleged conduct is somehow part of a conspiracy based on Church doctrine. [5. There is no doctrine of “Fair Game” in Scientology. (1 AA 187.) Plaintiffs’ contrary opinions about religious doctrine cannot create vicarious liability given the evidence provided by the Church’s duly constituted ecclesiastical leadership, which alone has authority to determine and articulate Church doctrine. (Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (1969) 393 U.S. 440, 450 [89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658] [“the First Amendment forbids civil courts” from determining “the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion”].)] (RB 30.) Plaintiffs’ inflammatory rhetoric about a minority religion is meant to distract from the actual issues on appeal in ways that would not be tolerated if directed at Muslims, Jews, or Christians.

Moreover, in focusing on inflammatory rhetoric and allegations in the complaint not subject to the anti-SLAPP motion, plaintiffs attempt to improperly expand the scope of the anti-SLAPP analysis to encompass unprotected activity that is completely irrelevant to the allegations of protected activity that the Church challenges. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) Plaintiffs keep pounding these non-speech-related allegations to turn this narrow appeal into an evaluation of their entire complaint. It isn’t.

Plaintiffs may continue to litigate, before the trial court, any parts of their causes of action that arise from unprotected activity. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) That is most of the content of their complaint. The anti-SLAPP statute does not cover such allegations. But on the other hand, “refusing to strike any part of a cause of action that rests in part on protected activity defeats the legislative goal of protecting defendants from meritless claims based on such conduct.” (Ibid.) The Church challenges only those narrow portions of plaintiffs’ complaint here

II. The Church is not prohibited from seeking anti-SLAPP relief just because plaintiffs pleaded an agency theory.

Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks to hold the Church liable for the acts of third parties based on an agency theory. (See, e.g., 1 AA 68 [referring to “Defendants’ agent Kathy Gold”].) On appeal, plaintiffs argue the Church lacks standing to pursue anti-SLAPP relief if it denies that these third parties were its agents. (RB 16–17.) Thus, the argument goes, the Church must either accept plaintiffs’ agency theory—and lose that argument at step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis—or dispute agency—and lose the right to anti-SLAPP relief at the outset. (RB 16–17, 34.) This “heads I win, tails you lose,” theory fundamentally misunderstands the anti-SLAPP statute.

Plaintiffs are confused by the statute’s burden-shifting framework. At step one, “[t]he question is what is pled—not what is proven.” (Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 942 (Comstock); Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 672 [“the issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings”].) At this point in the analysis, the defendant does not have to “confirm[ ] the factual basis for the plaintiff’s claims.” (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 929 (Bel Air Internet).) Instead, the allegations in the complaint are enough to show that a plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity. (Id. at p. 939.)

Once step one is satisfied, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce “competent admissible evidence” demonstrating that her claim has a probability of success. (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater).) At this point, the analysis must reach beyond the pleadings. (See ibid. [the plaintiff “ ‘may not rely solely on [her] complaint, even if verified’ ”].)

That is why a defendant does not “forfeit” its step one argument “by choosing to controvert the factual basis of [the plaintiff’s] claims in connection with the second prong of the anti-SLAPP procedure.” (Bel Air Internet, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 939.) “Otherwise, a defendant who disputes the plaintiff’s allegations . . . might be precluded from bringing an anti-SLAPP motion,” perversely making anti-SLAPP relief “unavailable when a plaintiff alleges a baseless claim.” (Ibid.) Indeed, that is almost always the case for a winning anti-SLAPP motion. The allegations in the complaint are false but they trigger the protection of the statute.

Plaintiffs push for that perverse result here. They insist that a defendant cannot argue that allegations arise from protected activity if the defendant also denies those allegations. To illustrate why that does not work, consider a case where a plaintiff sues for defamation, and the defendant counters that he never made the alleged statement at all. Under plaintiffs’ theory here, the defendant would lose the ability to file an anti-SLAPP motion because the statute applies only to the “statements of a defendant.” (RB 16.) And in this illustration, the defendant argues he never made those statements. That cannot be the law. [6. Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 141, does not help plaintiffs. In Shekhter, the Court of Appeal held that a law firm did have standing to bring an anti-SLAPP motion against a cause of action arising out of that firm’s suing on behalf of its client. (Id. at pp. 151–152.) Shekhter had nothing to do with vicarious liability of any sort.] Plaintiffs cannot defeat the Church’s anti-SLAPP motion by now claiming the Church did not do what plaintiffs themselves allege the Church did. (Comstock, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 942.)

III. Online publications and private statements that contribute to the debate on a public issue count as protected activity under step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

A. Plaintiffs do not dispute that their claims arise from the challenged allegations.

The trial court ruled that the allegations of speech that occurred before Bixler reported Masterson to the police do not supply a basis for plaintiffs’ claims. (2 AA 789–790; see 1 AA 50 [¶¶ 88–90].) The Church’s opening brief explains why this was incorrect. (AOB 35–39.)

Plaintiffs do not defend this portion of the trial court’s reasoning on appeal. Although plaintiffs dispute that the alleged private speech is protected activity, their brief does not address whether that speech supplies a basis for liability. Plaintiffs therefore do not dispute that their claims arise from that speech—whether protected or not—under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1). [7. All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.] In other words, the plaintiffs’ causes of action are themselves based on acts in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.)

B. The parties agree that the allegations of online speech satisfy step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) and (e)(4) cover communications that are made “in connection with” an issue of public interest. Under FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pages 149–150, a statement is made “in connection with” a public issue where (1) it can be reasonably understood to implicate a public issue, and (2) it bears a functional relationship to the public conversation about that issue.

The trial court was correct that all the allegations subject to the Church’s motion satisfy the first FilmOn step. (2 AA 791.) Plaintiffs do not challenge this finding. (RB 19.) As to the online publications—various social media posts and reviews of Riales’s food truck (1 AA 53 [¶ 110], 54 [¶ 111], 68 [¶ 190], 72 [¶ 220], 73 [¶ 227], 77 [¶¶ 253, 256])—the trial court ruled further that it was “self-evident” they satisfied the second FilmOn step as well (2 AA 793). They thus pass the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Plaintiffs do not dispute this finding either. (RB 19– 20.)

All the same, plaintiffs assert that these online publications are “irrelevant” to this appeal because the trial court denied anti-SLAPP protection only to “a narrow set of private, threatening communications.” (RB 19, original formatting omitted.) They misread the trial court’s order. Although the trial court found that the online publications were protected activity that met the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court then denied anti-SLAPP relief at step two. (2 AA 800 [denying the defendants’ motions to strike in their entirety].) That is why the Church appealed the trial court’s order as to the allegations concerning online publications. These allegations are a key part of this appeal, not a “strategic distraction.” (RB 19, original formatting omitted.) The only distraction is by plaintiffs who focus the vast majority of their brief discussing allegations that have nothing to do with this narrow, targeted appeal.

C. The alleged private speech contributed to the public discourse. That satisfies step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Private speech satisfies FilmOn’s second “functional relationship” inquiry when the defendant “participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151.) The defendant’s action “ ‘must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) The analysis “does not turn on a normative evaluation of the substance of the speech.” (Id. at p. 151.) Similarly, the “claimed illegitimacy” of the defendant’s actions is not considered at this stage. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 (Navellier).) [8. The trial court correctly ruled that paragraph 175, lines 5–6, which alleged speech to a reporter—satisfied FilmOn. (2 AA 793.) As with the online publications, plaintiffs on appeal do not dispute this finding. (RB 19, fn.2.)]

Yet that is what plaintiffs urge this court to do. Plaintiffs repeat the trial court’s premise that speech that suppresses other speech is categorically unprotected by section 425.16. (RB 21.) They urge this court to evaluate the normative value of the speech, contrary to the California Supreme Court’s instructions.

This court should decline the invitation. “[E]fforts to prevent damaging information . . . from entering or remaining in the public arena,” as the trial court put it (2 AA 792), may not propel the conversation in the direction that plaintiffs desire. But such efforts are clear attempts to influence the public narrative. (AOB 31–35.) They thereby contribute to the public debate.

Plaintiffs try to wriggle free of this fact by characterizing these actions as both tortious and private, and thus undeserving of anti-SLAPP protection. But the law forecloses these arguments.

First, plaintiffs point out that the speech at issue was “private” and “targeted.” (RB 20–24.) If they are arguing that private speech is not covered by section 425.16’s “catchall” provision, they are wrong. The California Supreme Court has “declined to hold ‘that section 425.16 does not apply to events that transpire between private individuals.’ ” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 91, quoting Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1116 (Briggs).)

This mistaken view about protections for private speech helps explain plaintiffs’ reliance on Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893. In Bishop, the court held that a termination letter sent only to the plaintiff did not contribute to the public discourse. (Id. at pp. 906–907.) This was because the statements in the letter “were made solely for private purposes” and not, for example, to “prompt” the recipient of the letter to act on its contents. (Ibid., quoting Murray v. Tran (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 10, 36.) But Bishop is not on point because, here, the speech directed at plaintiffs was not made solely for private purposes. It was made with the purpose of influencing the public discourse. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151.) As the complaint alleges, the goal of this speech was to change the public discussion about Masterson’s alleged guilt. (1 AA 79, 83.)

Second, plaintiffs repeatedly characterize these private communications as “tortious conduct” that was meant to harass and intimidate plaintiffs into silence. (RB 20.) Plaintiffs thereby invoke the discredited proposition that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply where the defendant’s activity “was not ‘valid.’ ” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94.) But the “ ‘claimed illegitimacy’ ” of a defendant’s conduct is an issue reserved for the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, where the plaintiffs must show a probability of success on their claims. (Ibid.) “To conclude otherwise would effectively immunize claims of discrimination or retaliation”—or stalking and IIED—“from anti-SLAPP scrutiny, even though the statutory text establishes no such immunity.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 889–890 (Wilson).) Courts should not consider the “social utility” of the speech, nor whether it “propelled the conversation in any particular direction.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 151.)

Similarly, the speaker’s motives are not considered at this stage. “Notwithstanding assertions of an illicit motive, ‘[i]f the acts alleged in support of the plaintiff’s claim are of the sort protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, then anti-SLAPP protections apply.’ ” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1008, quoting Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887.) Plaintiffs’ assertion that the speech was meant to intimidate is irrelevant.

Plaintiffs also fail to distinguish Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534 (Terry). That case held that an internal report prepared by a church and shared at closed church meetings was a private communication that satisfied step one. (Id. at pp. 1546–1547.) Plaintiffs try to brush Terry aside by arguing that the closed church meetings involved “good-faith discussion” that was “collective and community-focused, not secretive or coercive.” (RB 21.) In other words, the supposed distinction between this case and Terry turns on plaintiffs’ own views about whether the speech is normatively good. But that does not affect whether the speech contributes to the public debate.

Finally, plaintiffs assert that the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect “authentic participation” in and “legitimate engagement” with public debate. (RB 25.) But in their view, the speech here consisted of “private acts of intimidation.” (Ibid.) This bald policy argument fails because the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to protect speech against “frivolous litigation,” not to steer the public discourse in any one way. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393, emphasis added.) Plaintiffs’ mere disagreement with these third parties’ “inauthentic” participation in public discourse does not shrink the statute’s reach. (See Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1119 [the legislature specifically amended section 425.16 to state that the statute “shall be construed broadly”].)

IV. Plaintiffs fail to meet their step-two burden of showing a probability of prevailing on their claims.

A. All plaintiffs’ claims against the Church require imposing vicarious liability, which they cannot support with admissible evidence.

1. Plaintiffs cannot show that any of the third parties mentioned in the complaint was an agent of the Church, and on appeal make no attempt to do so.

The trial court stated that it was “certainly questionable whether Plaintiffs have established an agency relationship.” (2 AA 799.) The trial court was correct. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations are insufficient to show a principal-agent relationship as to any of the third-party individuals who allegedly acted wrongly toward plaintiffs. (See Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1264, disapproved on another ground by Cohen v. Superior Court (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 706, 727 & fn. 11; AOB 42–45.)

On appeal, it appears that plaintiffs agree. Plaintiffs make no attempt to argue that any of these third parties were agents of the Church. They go as far as to assert that agency is “immaterial.” (RB 34, original formatting omitted.) Having failed to brief this issue on appeal, plaintiffs have forfeited it.

2. The trial court’s conspiracy theory fails.

a. The sections of plaintiffs’ brief regarding the trial court’s consideration of conspiracy contain citation errors and mischaracterizations of authority. These sections of the brief should be disregarded.

The California Rules of Court require that briefs “support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “When [the parties] do not furnish legal argument with citation to authority on a particular point, [the court] may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration.” (Shaw, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 754; see Eisenberg, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 9:21 [the court can treat as “meritless” any issue not supported by legal authority]; cf. Wentworth v. Regents of University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, 596 [“The Courts of Appeal have the discretion to disregard contentions unsupported by proper page cites to the record [citation] and will conclude that parties forfeit arguments by failing to support statements in the argument section of a brief with record citations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)].)

Sections III.B.1 and III.B.2 of plaintiffs’ brief contain citations to authority that do not support the propositions for which they are used. [9. These are not the only sections of plaintiffs’ brief that contain such errors, as explained below. (See pp. 30–33, 39–40, post.)]

Plaintiffs cite Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768–770, for the proposition that “[a] party need not reiterate in briefing a theory already stated in the complaint.” (RB 31.) But Vaccaro is about a trial court’s discretion to refuse to consider a belatedly signed and filed complaint. It says nothing about whether anti-SLAPP briefing need repeat legal theories contained in a complaint, especially with respect to prong two where it is the plaintiffs’ burden to come forward with admissible evidence to establish the merit of their claims. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.)

Plaintiffs cite Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 593, for the proposition that where “the complaint alleges and sets forth specific facts supporting a conspiracy, the court is not only permitted but required to consider that theory in its analysis of liability.” (RB 31.) But that case is about when the statute of limitations runs for professional malpractice claims. It has nothing to do with conspiracy.

Plaintiffs cite to a nonexistent page range in Golden Gate Land Holdings, LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 82, for the proposition that “detailed factual allegations of direct participation or ratification are more than adequate to warrant judicial consideration.” (RB 31–32.) But Golden Gate said nothing about the viability of a vicarious liability theory at step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis, because it held at step one that the claims did not arise from protected activity.

Plaintiffs have failed to cite legal authority in support of their argument that the trial court properly considered conspiracy as a theory of liability. This is possibly due to relying on AI to draft their brief. This court should disregard plaintiffs’ argument.

b. Plaintiffs did not argue or present competent evidence of conspiracy.

The lack of legal authority aside, plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court could raise a conspiracy theory sua sponte to save plaintiffs’ claims fails.

First, plaintiffs forfeited conspiracy as a theory of liability because they did not brief it in their oppositions to the Church’s motion. (See 1 AA 360–380, 458–475, 542–561; 2 AA 633–653.) Under the principle of party presentation, the parties frame the issues for decision, not the court. (People v. Richardson (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 360, 368.) It is also plaintiffs’ burden under step two to introduce admissible evidence to establish merit to their claims. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) The trial court ignored this principle by independently raising conspiracy as a basis for liability and excusing plaintiffs’ obligations under step two. (1 RT 27, 36; 2 RT 309.) That was an abuse of discretion. (AOB 52–55.) And plaintiffs cite no legal authority to the contrary on appeal. (See ante, pp. 25–26.)

Second, in any event, no competent evidence supports conspiracy. Plaintiffs therefore cannot show a probability of success at step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is a “summary-judgment-like procedure.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) The evidence plaintiffs offer to meet their burden of showing a probability of success on the merits cannot be mere regurgitation of unsupported allegations from their complaint. (See Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 940 [a plaintiff “ ‘may not rely solely on [her] complaint, even if verified’ ”].) Further, averment based on “information and belief, within the context of a special motion to strike a SLAPP suit, is inadequate to show ‘a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’ ” (Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497.)

To prove the existence of a conspiracy, plaintiffs must show, inter alia, the existence of an agreement to commit an unlawful act. (In re Banks (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 463, 468.) While circumstantial evidence may be considered, “there must be some evidence from which the unlawful agreement can be inferred.” (People v. Drolet (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 207, 218; see Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 784–785 [finding a conspiracy requires that “two or more persons agree to perform a wrongful act” (emphasis added)].)

Plaintiffs have never presented any evidence of such an agreement. Their declarations simply mirror the allegations in the complaint. They state conclusorily that “known agent[s] of Scientology” and “known affiliate[s] of Defendants” surveilled and harassed them. (RB 29–30; see, e.g., 1 AA 525 [stating “[u]pon information and belief” that these actions were carried out by agents of the defendants].) Plaintiffs’ “evidence” boils down to base speculation that, because these unidentified people were supposedly affiliated with Scientology, they must have had an agreement with the Church to commit wrongful acts. That is insufficient. It is no different than saying that the Catholic Church can be sued as a co-conspirator because a tortfeasor happens to be a Catholic. Plaintiffs need actual evidence confirming the third parties’ actual affiliation with the Church and that there was an illicit agreement between them. No such evidence was presented. Plaintiffs therefore cannot “demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 940.)

Plaintiffs make the curious argument that the Church forfeited its argument opposing plaintiffs’ unbriefed conspiracy theory. They argue that during the February 13, 2024, hearing, the trial court “offer[ed]” the Church the opportunity to brief conspiracy, but the Church “declined.” (RB 33.) Plaintiffs cite no authority for the novel proposition that failure to request additional briefing on an issue raised for the first time at a hearing constitutes failure to “cure a defect.” (RB 33.) Nor do they support their argument that such “failure” prohibits a party from arguing the issue on appeal or that it absolves a plaintiff from her obligation to come forward herself with admissible evidence to show merit to her claims under the anti-SLAPP statute’s second step.

Regardless, plaintiffs mischaracterize the hearing in this case. The trial court never “offered” additional briefing, so the Church did not turn down an offer that was never made. After the trial court raised the conspiracy issue for the first time at the hearing, one defense counsel initially suggested briefing might be useful. (1 RT 28.) However, additional briefing was ultimately deemed unnecessary by all parties and the trial court. (1 RT 47– 48; see 2 RT 309.) To be clear, it was unnecessary because plaintiffs had the burden to introduce admissible evidence supporting their claims. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) Here, the plaintiffs forfeited this argument by not identifying admissible evidence in their opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. The Church forfeited nothing.

B. Even assuming plaintiffs can establish vicarious liability for the acts of others, their claims fail.

1. The section of plaintiffs’ brief addressing their stalking claims contains citation errors, mischaracterizations of authority, and a made-up case. This section of the brief should be disregarded.

This court should decline to consider arguments unsupported by legal authority. (Shaw, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 754; see ante, p. 25.) Section III.D of plaintiffs’ brief addresses their stalking claims. This section contains numerous citation errors and mischaracterizations of authority.

Plaintiffs cite Terry, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pages 1547– 1548, for the proposition that a stalking claim under the California Civil Code does not demand a “hyper-technical approach to the demand element [of stalking]—especially where the record demonstrates that making such a demand would be dangerous, futile, or would expose the victim to further harm.” (RB 38.) Plaintiffs then argue that a stalking victim need not recite “ ‘magic words’ ” or “confront their harassers in perilous circumstances,” again citing and quoting Terry. (RB 38.) But that case has nothing to do with stalking. [10. And Terry does not contain the “magic words” language that plaintiffs quote in their brief. (RB 38.)] Terry involved defamation claims arising out of sexual misconduct allegations against two church youth group leaders. (Terry, at pp. 1538–1539.) Plaintiffs’ mischaracterization is especially perplexing given the parties’ extensive briefing on Terry in connection with the first step in the anti-SLAPP analysis. (AOB 21, 25–27; RB 21–22; ante, p. 23.)

Plaintiffs cite a case they call “People v. Uecker (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287,” which is an incorrect citation. (RB 38–39.) It appears plaintiffs meant to cite to either People v. Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287, or People v. Uecker (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 583 (Uecker). Although all of plaintiffs’ later references to “Uecker” cite a page range in Falck, the substance of some of these propositions leads the Church to believe that plaintiffs meant to cite the real People v. Uecker, and not to Falck. (See RB 38–39, 41, 42, 43.) In any event, neither case supports plaintiffs’ proposition that what matters for a stalking claim is “whether the defendant was unmistakably put on notice that the conduct was unwelcome and must end.” (RB 38.) Neither case considered the demand-to-cease requirement of a civil stalking claim.

Plaintiffs cite a case they call “Uecker v. Zentil (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 131, 149.” That case does not exist. It appears to combine three cases. There is a case called Uecker v. Zentil (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 789, which is about bankruptcy. There is another case called Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, which is about election law. And there is a case called GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141, which, while closer to the mark in that it involved an anti-SLAPP motion, was about defamation. These cases have nothing to do with stalking. And they do not support the proposition that “California courts have repeatedly recognized that the law does not elevate form over substance; what matters is whether the defendant was unmistakably put on notice that the conduct was unwelcome and must end.” (RB 38.)

Plaintiffs cite to People v. Lopez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436 (Lopez), which they erroneously call Lopez v. Smith. (RB 39.)

Lopez and Uecker do not support most of the propositions for which plaintiffs cite them. For example, plaintiffs state that the courts in these cases found exigent circumstances relieving stalking victims of their duty to demand that the defendants cease their conduct. (RB 41.) But these criminal stalking cases had nothing to do with exigent circumstances or the demand-to-cease requirement for stalking under Civil Code section 1708.7, subdivision (a)(3)(A). Moreover, the victims in those cases repeatedly told the defendants to stop. (Lopez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 440–444; Uecker, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 587, 589.) Similar mischaracterizations of these cases appear elsewhere in plaintiffs’ brief. (See Attachment A.)

Section III.D of plaintiffs’ brief is filled with serious citation errors, possibly the result of AI. This court should decline to consider any argument plaintiffs offer therein.

2. Baral prohibits considering unprotected allegations, and there is no exception for “pattern-based torts.”

On appeal, plaintiffs defend the trial court’s decision to consider unprotected activity in support of plaintiffs’ claims for stalking, IIED, and loss of consortium. (RB 39–40; see 2 AA 797, fn. 25.) In so doing, they advance a theory that fundamentally misunderstands the seminal California Supreme Court cases on this topic.

Baral did away with the so-called Mann rule. Under Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 106 (Mann), a plaintiff could defeat an anti-SLAPP motion by showing a “probability of prevailing on any part of its claim.” As long as some part of the plaintiff’s cause of action had “some merit,” the “entire cause of action” stood. (Ibid.) The Mann rule permitted “artful pleading to evade the reach of the anti-SLAPP statute. By mixing allegations of protected and unprotected activity, the pleader [could] avoid scrutiny of the claims involving protected activity.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 392.) As Baral explained, this rule was “arbitrary” and could not be “squared with the language or the intent” of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 393.) Instead, “[t]he anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus” is the “defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability,” not “the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 92.)

In disapproving of Mann, Baral made clear that the “particular alleged acts giving rise to a claim for relief may be the object of an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 395.) Where plaintiffs allege “various acts as a basis for relief and not merely as background, each act or set of acts must be analyzed separately under the usual two-step anti-SLAPP framework.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012, emphasis added.)

The allegations the Church’s motion targets are not mere background details. They support claims for harassment and IIED and are subject to being stricken. Plaintiffs themselves confirm as much. Plaintiffs’ complaint bases the stalking claim in part on alleged “information suppression,” “coercion,” and “obstruct[ing] justice by withholding the facts of Masterson’s sexual assaults from civil authorities.” (1 AA 79 [¶¶ 270–271].) The complaint likewise bases the IIED claim in part on alleged “willful[ ] concealing [of] information” and “silencing Plaintiffs.” (1 AA 83 [¶ 293].) And on appeal, by arguing that the “interrelationship of all acts—protected and unprotected—are essential to establishing the requisite elements of the torts alleged,” plaintiffs admit that some of their claims are based on protected activity. (RB 51.)

This is why the trial court was wrong to consider the unprotected allegations underlying plaintiffs’ stalking claims at step two. (See 2 AA 796–797.) Even if allegations “not covered by the anti-SLAPP statute” might support plaintiffs’ stalking claims, that does not immunize the portions of plaintiffs’ claims arising from protected activity. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 392–393.) Those claims must be analyzed independent of the rest of plaintiffs’ complaint.

On appeal, plaintiffs double down on their mistaken reading of Baral. Plaintiffs apparently interpret the opinion as instructing that the division between protected and unprotected activity evaporates at step two. (RB 50 [“Neither Baral, nor Bonni stand for a preposition [sic] that protected activity alone must establish the merit of a claim that relies on both types of activity”].) But that makes no sense because Baral “was a second-step anti-SLAPP case.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) Baral held that “in cases involving allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a probability of prevailing on any claim for relief based on allegations of protected activity.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 395, emphasis added.) The division still matters at step two. [11. Plaintiffs accuse the Church of quoting sentences from Baral out of context. (RB 49.) But they never identify these sentences and the opening brief cites Baral correctly.]

In the face of Baral’s clear instruction to ignore separate allegations of unprotected activity, plaintiffs request an exemption. They press the novel theory that Baral does not apply to so-called “pattern-based torts” like stalking. (RB 51.) The trial court based its ruling on similar grounds, reasoning that stalking claims are based on a continuous course of conduct. (2 AA 797.)

But the trial court cited no authority for this supposed “pattern-based torts” exception. Neither do plaintiffs on appeal. Nor could they. Neither Baral nor Bonni purported to limit their holdings to categories of actions whose components could be “cleanly separated.” [12. It is unclear what this phrase means. And plaintiffs ignore that Bonni itself involved a “pattern-based” claim for a “course of retaliation” based on “16 principal adverse actions or categories of conduct.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1015, 1017.) The court had no trouble analyzing “each act or set of acts” “separately.” (Id. at p. 1012.)] (RB 51.) And by turning every cause of action for stalking or IIED into a single indivisible claim, plaintiffs’ novel exception would require defendants to succeed in striking the entire cause of action, or none of it. This “patternbased torts” exception would thus reward the “artful pleading” of the old Mann rule, shifting the focus of the anti-SLAPP analysis from the defendant’s activity to the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393.) Plaintiffs seek to resurrect the very same ancien régime that Baral put to rest.

3. Plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits.

Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden at step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show a probability of success on their stalking, IIED, and loss of consortium claims that arise from protected activity.

To prevail on their stalking claims, plaintiffs must present competent evidence that these third parties made credible threats, and that plaintiffs “clearly and definitively” demanded that they cease such conduct. (Civ. Code, § 1708.7, subd. (a)(3)(A).) A “credible threat” is a verbal or written threat or a pattern of conduct “made with the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat.” (Id., § 1708.7, subd. (b)(2).)

Plaintiffs hang their hats on the court’s accepting their proposed “pattern-based torts” exception. They no longer argue that the protected acts themselves constitute credible threats. [13. Instead, plaintiffs point to portions of their complaint containing allegations of unprotected activity. (RB 44.) They argue that this “evidence” “collectively support[s] the inference” of a campaign of intimidation. (Ibid.) But this “evidence” is irrelevant to the stalking claims arising from allegations of protected activity. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 392–393.) The question is whether social media posts and private outreach can constitute a credible threat. They cannot. And plaintiffs do not try to argue otherwise.

Nor do plaintiffs have evidence that they demanded that these third parties cease this conduct. Plaintiffs again point to language in their declarations stating that they told “individuals that were harassing [them] to cease their actions.” (1 AA 396 [¶ 101], 569 [¶ 44]; 2 AA 658 [¶ 34].) These conclusory declaration statements fail to identify when these supposed demands were made and to whom, and are not competent evidence of “clear[ ] and definitiv[e]” demands to cease. (Civ. Code, § 1708.7, subd. (a)(3)(A).)

Nor can plaintiffs invoke exigent circumstances to get around the demand requirement. To start, every citation to Uecker, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 583, and Lopez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 436, in this portion of plaintiffs’ brief mischaracterizes those cases. (RB 41–42; ante, pp. 31–32.) In so doing, plaintiffs present no legal support for their argument that there is “no temporal limitation on what qualifies as an exigent circumstance.” (RB 41.) They therefore have not addressed the point that conduct over several years does not create any “exigency.” (AOB 48–49.) In any event, the alleged conduct plaintiffs identify as making a demand dangerous or futile is all unprotected and irrelevant to the claims the Church challenges. (RB 41–42.)

Plaintiffs’ IIED claims fare no better. To meet their burden of showing evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671), they point only to the salacious allegations of unprotected activity that are irrelevant to this appeal. (RB 46 [plaintiffs were subjected to “a sustained campaign of harassment that caused them severe emotional and psychological harm”].) Plaintiffs understandably decline to argue that social media posts, food truck reviews, or conversations about the plaintiffs’ allegations against Masterson were extreme or outrageous.

The parties agree that Bixler-Zavala’s loss of consortium claim hinges on Bixler’s claims. (RB 47–48.) It therefore fails to the extent that Bixler’s claims fail.

Plaintiffs also argue that, by pointing to the lack of evidence that some online statements even occurred (see AOB 45–47), the Church is improperly inviting the court to “weigh” competing evidence (RB 36). Not so. Plaintiffs have not presented evidence to weigh in the first place. As explained, at step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing, with competent evidence, that their claims have minimal merit. (Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th. at p. 940.)

In making this argument, plaintiffs continue to mischaracterize the holdings of cases. They cite Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 888 (Medical Marijuana), for the proposition that they are only required to describe the substance of the alleged statements, “particularly” for claims involving harassment, stalking, and IIED. (RB 36.)

But Medical Marijuana, Inc. involved a defamation claim, and had nothing to do with harassment, stalking, or IIED. And, if anything, that case stands for the opposite proposition for which plaintiffs cite it. The plaintiffs in Medical Marijuana, Inc. possessed a “written copy of the article published by the defendants.” (Medical Marijuana, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 894.) The court held that, in such a circumstance, there was “simply no justification” for plaintiffs to “set forth in their complaint only the ‘substance’ of the statements that they claim are defamatory, instead of the actual statements.” (Id. at p. 894.)

Plaintiffs then cite a case they call “Musero,” while citing a reporter page number contained in a case called Greco v. Greco (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 810. (RB 37.) That case does not support plaintiffs’ proposition—that their declarations are competent evidence—either. Yet again, plaintiffs’ brief appears to rely on AI for drafting.

* * *

Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden at step two. Their claims arising from protected activity do not have a probability of success on the merits.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this court should reverse the trial court’s ruling and strike the challenged allegations.

September 8, 2025

HORVITZ & LEVY LLP: JEREMY B. ROSEN, JASJAAP S. SIDHU, RYAN M. DUNBAR; WINSTON & STRAWN LLP: JEFFREY L. STEINFELD

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